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Abstract
In recent years, it has been found that neural networks can be eas-
ily fooled by adversarial examples, which is a potential safety hazard in
some safety-critical applications. Many researchers have proposed various
method to make neural networks more robust to white-box adversarial
attacks, but an effective method have not been found so far. In this short
paper, we focus on the robustness of the features learned by neural net-
works. We show that the features learned by neural networks are not
robust, and find that the robustness of the learned features is closely re-
lated to the resistance against adversarial examples of neural networks.
We also find that adversarial training against fast gradients sign method
(FGSM) does not make the leaned features very robust, even if it can make
the trained networks very resistant to FGSM attack. Then we propose a
method, which can be seen as an extension of adversarial training, to train
neural networks to learn more robust features. We perform experiments
on MNIST and CIFAR-10 to evaluate our method, and the experiment
results show that this method greatly improves the robustness of neural
networks and the features they learn.
Keywords: Adversarial examples, Adversarial training, Neural networks,
Robustness
1 Introduction
Although neural networks have been applied in a variety of tasks, they have
proven to be vulnerable to adversarial examples [1], the examples slightly per-
turbed using some attack technique such as Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
[2] or C&W’s Attack [3]. To defend adversarial examples, researchers have pro-
posed many methods to increase the robustness of machine learning models,
and the most famous one is adversarial training.
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The simplest version of adversarial training proposed in [2] trains models
against the examples generated by FGSM, and the models trained by it are
much more resistant to FGSM but not significantly more resistant to stronger
adversaries [6], e.g. C&W’s Attack. [4] proposed to train models against a
stronger adversary projected gradient descent (PGD) attack. They found that
adversarial training against PGD attack can significantly increase the resistance
to adversarial examples generated by various techniques significantly, including
PGD and C&Ws Attack. However, their method requires computing the gra-
dients w.r.t. the inputs dozens of times to generate adversarial examples to
update the parameters of a model once. [8] found ”error amplification effect”
that small adversarial perturbations added to input will be amplified in high-
level representations, which cause neural networks to make wrong predictions.
In this paper, to study how adversarial training influences neural networks,
we focus on the robustness of the features learned by neural networks. We
evaluate the robustness of the features by computing the distortions of the
normalized values of the features, and we show that the features learned by
neural networks are not robust. We find that adversarial training against FGSM
can make the learned features more robust but still not very robust, even if
it can make the trained networks very resistant to FGSM attack. To train
neural networks to learn more robust features, we propose a method to make
the learned features be distorted less by the perturbations added to the inputs.
In the rest of this paper, we first briefly introduce FGSM, PGD attack and
adversarial training in Section 2. In Section 3, we first study the robustness of
the features learned by neural networks, and then we detail our simple method
for learning more robust features. The proposed method will be empirically
evaluated in Section 4. Finally we draw a conclusion in Section 5.
2 Background
Fast gradient sign method (FGSM). Fast gradient sign method is a com-
putationally efficient method for generating adversarial examples. It perturbs
an example in the direction of the sign of the gradient of the loss function w.r.t.
the input:
x∗ = x+  · sign(∇x · J(θ, x, y)) (1)
where x is an example, y is the label of x, J(θ,x,y) is the loss function used to
generate adversarial examples, x∗ is the perturbed example and  is a constant
used to control the size of perturbations. Though FGSM attack is computa-
tionally efficient, its success rate is usually relatively low.
Projected gradient descent (PGD) attack. Projected gradient descent
attack generates adversarial examples by iteratively applying FGSM and pro-
jecting the perturbed example to be a valid example multiple times. It is a
stronger adversary than FGSM, i.e. it can attack models with higher success
rates.
Adversarial training. Adversarial training trains a model with this ob-
jective function:
Jadv(θ, x, y) = α · J(θ, x, y) + (1− α) · J(θ, x∗, y), (2)
2
where α is a constant used to control the strength of the adversary, and
x∗ can be generated by any method. In this paper we use FGSM to generate
adversarial examples in adversarial training.
3 Learning more robust features
In this section, we first introduce how we evaluate the robustness of the features
learned by neural networks and make observations about the robustness of the
learned features. Then we detail our simple method to train neural networks to
learn more robust features.
3.1 Robustness of Learned Features
Perturbations to inputs can cause distortions of the values of the features in
the hidden layers, and the values of more robust features will be distorted less
by adversarial perturbations. So we need an appropriate metric to measure
the distortions of the values of the features for measure the robustness of the
features. The scales of the values of the features should not influence measured
distortions, otherwise comparing distortions will become meaningless and, more
importantly, encouraging distortions to be small will make the scales of the
values of the features become small. Therefore, we apply batch normalization
[5] to all networks in this paper and we only measure the distortions of the
normalized values of features.
For a given feature, we measure the distortion d between the original value
of it and the distorted value of it as d = (z − z∗)2, where z is the normalized
value of the feature and z∗ is the normalized distorted value of the feature. In
testing phase, we compute the mean distortions of the values of the features in
a layer to evaluate the robustness of the features in that layer.
Now we perform an experiment to evaluate the robustness of the features
learned by standard neural networks and adversarially trained neural networks.
Because FGSM cannot find adversarial examples reliably, especially for adver-
sarially trained (against FGSM) networks [9], we do not use the examples gener-
ated by FGSM to evaluate the robustness of the learned features. And because
PGD is a universal first-order adversary [4], i.e. the strongest adversary utilizing
the local first order information, we use PGD to generate adversarial examples
to evaluate the robustness of the learned features.
We first use normal technique and adversarial training (against FGSM) to
train 2 networks on MNIST respectively and 2 networks on CIFAR-10 respec-
tively (the network architectures can be found in Appendix). Then we compute
the mean distortions of the values of the features in every normalization layer
caused by adversarial perturbations, as is shown in Fig. 1. We also report the
accuracies that the 4 networks achieve on different test data in Table 1.
Although the metric we use to measure the distortions of value of the features
is different from the metric used in [8], we also observe the ”error amplification
effect”. And the amplitudes of the distortions indicate that the learned features
are not robust. We observe that adversarial training increases the robustness
of the learned features and makes the trained networks slightly more resistant
to PGD attack, which indicates that more robust features lead to higher resis-
tance to adversarial attack. But adversarial training does not make the learned
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features very robust.
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Fig. 1. The mean distortions of the values of the features learned by the 6
networks
Table 1: The accuracies that the 4 networks (standard two and adversarially
trained two) achieve on different test data sets
Models
MNIST CIFAR-10
Clean FGSM PGD Clean FGSM PGD
Standard 0.9939 0.0922 0 0.9306 0.5524 0.0256
Adversarially trained 0.9932 0.9492 0.0612 0.8755 0.8526 0.1043
3.2 Proposed Method
As observed above, more robust features will lead to higher resistance to PGD
attack, which means higher resistance to all first-order adversaries because PGD
is the strongest first-order adversary [4]. In order to make the features learned by
neural networks more robust, we add a distortion term to the original adversarial
objective function to encourage the distortions to be smaller during training.
Formally, we train neural networks with this objective function:
J˜adv(θ, x, y) = α · J(θ, x, y) + (1− α) · J(θ, x∗, y) +
L−1∑
i=1
βi ·
hi∑
j=1
dij (3)
where L - 1 is the number of the normalization layers of the trained network, hi
is the number of features in the ith layer, dij is the distortion of the value of jth
normalized feature in the ith layer, βi is a constant for balancing every term.
The adversary for adversarial training can be any adversary, e.g. the universal
first-order adversary PGD attack, however we use FGSM as our adversary in this
paper for computationally efficiency. According to our experience, the values of
α and βis can significantly influence the performance of the trained model, and
we find that setting larger βis for higher layers is relatively better.
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4 Experiment
In this section we evaluate our method on MNIST and CIFAR-10. We evaluate
both the resistance against PGD attack and FGSM attack and the robustness
of the learned features. The hyper-parameters for training the networks can
be found in Appendix. For MNIST, the adversarial examples are generated by
PGD with 20 steps of size 0.01(`∞) and FGSM with  = 0.2. For CIFAR-10,
the adversarial examples are generated by PGD with 12 steps of size 1(`∞) and
FGSM with  = 4.
The accuracies the trained networks achieve on clean test data and perturbed
test data are in Table 2, and the mean distortions of the values of the features
learned by the 6 networks are in Fig. 2. We can observe that our method
significantly increase the robustness of the learned features and the resistance
to both PGD attack and FGSM attack.
Despite the significant increase of resistance and robustness, the networks
are still not very resistant to adversarial attacks. We believe that using PGD
as the adversary during training can make the trained networks more resistant
to adversarial attacks and make the learned features more robust.
Table 2: The accuracies the trained networks achieve on clean test data and
perturbed test data
Models
MNIST CIFAR-10
Clean FGSM PGD Clean FGSM PGD
Standard 0.9939 0.0922 0 0.9306 0.5524 0.0256
Adversarially trained 0.9932 0.9492 0.0612 0.8755 0.8526 0.1043
Our method 0.9903 0.9713 0.9171 0.8714 0.6514 0.3440
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Fig. 2. The mean distortions of the values of the features learned by the
6 networks. Note that the distortions are caused by PGD attack due to the
reason mentioned in Section 3
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5 Conclusion
In this short paper, we studied the robustness of the feature representations
learned by the neural networks trained by standard technique and adversarial
training and, based on the observations, we proposed a simple method to train
networks to learn more robust features and thus to be more resistant to the
adversarial attacks.
Our method is similar to the method proposed in [7] in the sense that they
both leveraging adversarial training to force the distortions of internal features
or representations caused by adversarial perturbations to be small. But their
method only leverages the representation in one layer of a network and the
representation is not normalized and, most importantly, their method has not
been shown to be able improve the resistance to some stronger adversaries such
as PGD attack.
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Appendix
We detail the settings of the neural networks used in our experiments here.
The architectures of the neural networks for MNIST and CIFAR-10 are in
Table 3. Note that batch normalization is applied to the networks. The hyper-
parameters for training are in Table 4.
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Table 3: The architectures of the neural networks for MNIST and CIFAR-10
MNIST CIFAR-10
Conv(5, 5, 1, 64) + ReLU Conv(3, 3, 3, 64) + ReLU
Maxpool(2, 2) Conv(3, 3, 64, 64) + ReLU
FC(1024) + ReLU Conv(3, 3, 128, 128)
Conv(5, 5, 64, 128) + ReLU Maxpool(2, 2)
Maxpool(2, 2) Conv(3, 3, 64, 128) + ReLU
FC(1024) + ReLU Conv(3, 3, 128, 128)
Softmax(10) Maxpool(2, 2)
Conv(3, 3, 128, 256) + ReLU
Conv(3, 3, 256, 256) + ReLU
Conv(3, 3, 256, 256) + ReLU
Maxpool(2, 2)
Conv(3, 3, 512, 512) + ReLU
Conv(3, 3, 512, 512) + ReLU
Conv(3, 3, 512, 512) + ReLU
Maxpool(2, 2)
FC(1024) + ReLU
FC(1024) + ReLU
Softmax(10)
Table 4: The hyper parameters for training
Training method α  βis
Adv. training
MNIST 0.2 0.2 ×
CIFAR-10 0.2 4 ×
Our method
MNIST 0.2 0.2 1e-7, 1e-7, 3e-7
CIFAR-10 0.2 4
0, 0, 3e-8, 9e-8, 12e-8, 15e-8,
18e-8, 21e-8, 24e-8, 48e-8, 48e-8
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